Abstract. We consider the task of extending a given coin toss. By this, we mean the two-party task of using a single instance of a given coin toss protocol in order to interactively generate more random coins. A bit more formally, our goal is to generate n common random coins from a single use of an ideal functionality that gives m < n common random coins to both parties. In the framework of universal composability, we show the impossibility of securely extending a coin toss for statistical and perfect security. On the other hand, for computational security, the existence of a protocol for coin toss extension depends on the number m of random coins that can be obtained "for free." For the case of stand-alone security, i.e., a simulation-based security definition without an environment, we present a protocol for statistically secure coin toss extension. Our protocol works for superlogarithmic m, which is optimal as we show the impossibility of statistically secure coin toss extension for smaller m. Combining our results with already known results, we obtain a (nearly) complete characterization under which circumstances coin toss extension is possible.
Introduction
Blum showed in [6] how to flip a coin over the telephone line. His protocol guarantees that even if one party does not follow the protocol, the other party still gets a uniformly distributed coin toss outcome. This general concept of generating common randomness in a way such that no dishonest party can dictate the outcome proved very useful in cryptography, for example, in the construction of protocols for general secure multiparty computation.
Here, we are interested in the task of extending a given coin toss. That is, suppose that two parties already have the possibility of making a single m-bit coin toss. Is it possible for them to get n > m bits of common randomness? The answer we come up with is basically: "It depends on the security model and on the length of the coin toss used as seed."
The first thing the extensibility of a given coin toss depends on is the required kind of security. In this work, we will consider simulation-based security notions, in which a protocol is secure if and only if it "imitates" an ideal functionality. For the case of coin toss, this ideal functionality will act as a trusted host that simply equips both parties with common random coins. However, we would like to stress that we would like to model an interactive coin toss protocol. Hence, the coin toss ideal functionality first expects an "activation signal" from both parties before handing out the random coins. This is quite different from a "common random string" (CRS) functionality that does not require such activation signals. (In fact, in this work, we will investigate also CRSs and CRS extension protocols, with somewhat different results compared to the coin toss case.)
A little more technically, one specific kind of security requirement (which we call "standalone simulatability" here) is that the protocol imitates the ideal coin toss functionality in the sense of [14] , where a simulator has to invent a realistic protocol run after learning the outcome of the ideal coin toss. A stronger type of requirement is to demand universal composability, which basically means that the protocol imitates an ideal coin toss functionality even in arbitrary protocol environments. Security in the latter sense can conveniently be captured in a simulatability framework like the universal composability framework [7] (see also [19] ) or the reactive simulatability model [3, 24] .
Orthogonal to this, one can vary the level of fulfillment of each of these security requirements. For example, one can demand stand-alone simulatability of the protocol with respect to polynomial-time adversaries in the sense that real protocol and ideal functionality are only computationally indistinguishable. This specific requirement is already fulfilled by the protocol of Blum. Alternatively, one can demand, for example, universal composability of the protocol with respect to unbounded adversaries. This would then yield statistical or even perfect security. We show that whether such a protocol exists depending on the asymptotic behavior of m.
Finally, we clarify that in this paper, we consider coin toss protocols that do not necessarily guarantee output in case one party is corrupted. (We only require that when both parties are honest and all messages are delivered, both parties will give the same output.) Our definition aligns in a natural way with other simulation-based definitions (and in particular, universal composability) that usually do not guarantee output. Yet, our definition is weaker than, for example, the one considered by Cleve [11] , Moran et al. [23] (which guarantees a uniformly distributed output in any case). Specifically, in our case, a dishonest party could abort the protocol (and potentially cause the other party not to output anything) once it learns that the result would have been unfavorable. We consider this weaker notion for the both assumed and achieved coin toss in a coin toss extension protocol. Hence, it is not clear to what extent even our negative results also hold for the stronger notion of coin toss. We note, however, that at least for stand-alone statistical security, we give a positive result (i.e., a coin toss extension protocol) that does guarantee output. "Depends" means that the entry is "yes" for superlogarithmic m, and "no" otherwise
Our results are summarized in Table 1 . A "yes" or "no" indicates whether a protocol for coin toss extension exists in that setting. "Depends" means that the answer depends on the size of the seed (the m-bit coin toss that is available by assumption). Boldface indicates novel results.
Known Results in the Perfect and Statistical Case
A folklore theorem states that (perfectly non-trivial) statistically secure coin toss is impossible from scratch (even in very lenient security models). Kitaev extended this result to protocols using quantum communication (cf. [1] ). The task of extending a given coin toss was first investigated by Bellare et al. [4] . They presented a statistically secure protocol for extending a given coin toss (pre-shared among many parties using a verifiable secret sharing scheme), if less than 1 6 of all parties are corrupted. Their result does not apply to the two-party case.
Our Results in the Perfect and Statistical Case
Our results in the perfect case are most easily explained. For the perfect case, we show impossibility of any coin toss extension, no matter how (in)efficient. We show this for stand-alone simulatability (Corollary 11) and for universal composability (Corollary 16).
We first observe (and abstract in a helper lemma) that we may assume that any (not necessarily efficient) coin toss extension has a certain outer form, both in the standalone and UC security settings. Most interestingly, we may assume that the protocol partners run the m-bit coin toss only at the end of the protocol, after all party-to-party communication. A little more formally, we show that every coin toss extension protocol can be transformed into an inefficient one in which parties do not communicate any more after initiating the m-bit coin toss. Our transformation runs 2 m instances of the original protocol in parallel, one for each possible seed (i.e., outcome of the m-bit coin toss). Note that these instances can all be run without knowledge of the actual seed. The m-bit coin toss is only initiated after all instances have terminated, and the resulting seed selects the protocol instance whose outcome is returned. We will show in the proof of the helper lemma that this modified protocol provides a secure coin toss, assuming the original protocol is secure.
We now outline our argument for the stand-alone case. The impossibility of perfectly secure coin toss extension in the case of universal composability then follows directly from that in the case of stand-alone simulatability because universal composability implies stand-alone simulatability.
So assume a coin toss extension protocol that extends an m-bit coin toss to an n-bit outcome in the perfect stand-alone setting. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol partners run the m-bit coin toss only at the end of the protocol, after all party-to-party communication. A little more formally, we show that every coin toss extension protocol (efficient or not, but perfectly secure in the stand-alone setting) can be transformed into an inefficient one in which parties do not communicate any more after initiating the m-bit coin toss. Our transformation runs 2 m instances of the original protocol in parallel, one for each possible seed (i.e., outcome of the m-bit coin toss). Note that these instances can all be run without knowledge of the actual seed. The m-bit coin toss is only initiated after all instances have terminated, and the resulting seed selects the protocol instance whose outcome is returned. We will show in the full proof that this modified protocol provides a secure coin toss, assuming the original protocol is secure. Now a run of a protocol (of the form above) up to the point where the m-bit coin toss is started yields a set of 2 m possible outcomes, each with probability 2 −m (corresponding to the probability of each single possible seed). This protocol run without the last step (i.e., without the m-bit coin toss) can hence be interpreted as a finite game with total information. At the end of that game, there are at most 2 m possible candidates for the final outcome.
The goal of the game for a corrupted Alice is to end in a state in which the all-zero string has a probability greater than zero (and thus greater-equal to 2 −m ), whereas a corrupted Bob will try to end in a state in which the all-zero string has probability 0. A finite game like this has a winning strategy, and either Alice can make the probability of the all-zero string nonzero (and thus ≥ 2 −m > 2 −n ) or Bob can make the probability of the all-zero string equal to zero. In either case, we have a contradiction to the perfect security of the coin toss extension (in which the probability of an all-zero outcome of the whole protocol is exactly 2 −n ). Now for the statistical case. When demanding only stand-alone simulatability, the situation depends on the number of already available common coins. Namely, we give an efficient protocol to extend m common coins to any polynomial number (in the security parameter), if m is superlogarithmic. The basic idea of the protocol is to have Alice and Bob each provide a bit string. The final outcome of the coin toss is then computed by applying a randomness extractor to (the concatenation of) both bit strings. The seed provided by the given m-bit coin toss will be used as the seed for the randomness extraction. (See Theorem 14 and its proof for details.)
A stand-alone coin toss extension even from m to m + 1 bits is impossible in the statistical case if the seed is too short, i.e., not superlogarithmic (Corollary 11). To sketch our argument, assume (for contradiction) a coin toss extension protocol that achieves statistical security for non-superlogarithmic m. Without loss of generality, we may again assume that the m-bit coin toss used as seed is only queried after all partyto-party communication.
Now consider a malicious protocol party (Alice) whose goal is to keep an all-zero outcome (of the constructed (m + 1)-bit coin toss) possible. More specifically, for each point p in a protocol run, we consider the probability of three possible conditions:
(1) Starting from p, an optimally playing Alice will "win," in the sense that in the last protocol step before the seed is chosen, the all-zero string has a probability not equal to zero. This nonzero probability is taken only over the value of the seed and hence must be noticeable (because the seed is short). In particular, the probability for an all-zero outcome is noticeably different from an ideal coin toss. (2) Starting from p, the protocol will not abort, and optimally playing Bob "wins," in the sense that the probability of the all-zero string is zero. Since m (and thus also m + 1) is not superlogarithmic, this also constitutes a noticeable difference to an ideal coin toss. (3) Starting from p, the protocol will abort with a nonzero probability even if both parties are uncorrupted.
We will show by induction that one of the conditions will be true with "high" probability at every point p in the protocol. Hence, the protocol will abort with "high" probability in the uncorrupted case, or one of Alice or Bob will be able to "win" and hence cheat in the coin toss extension.
In the statistical universal composability setting, the situation is more clear: We show that there is no protocol with polynomially many rounds that extends m to m + 1 coins, no matter how large m is (Theorem 15). (Note, however, that our result does not exclude the existence of coin toss protocols that run in a superpolynomial number of rounds.)
As above, we may assume that the protocol obtains the seed in the last protocol step. The core of our proof rests on the following observation: Given the communication between the environment and the adversary up to the point when the seed is chosen, at least half of the strings from {0, 1} n are no longer possible. The protocol proceeds in polynomially many rounds, and at the end (before the seed is chosen), a superpolynomial amount of strings has become impossible. Hence, there must have been a single "critical message" excluding a superpolynomial number of strings. The environment lets the adversary corrupt a party that sends such a critical message. Then, the environment chooses at random whether the critical message is sent or replaced by a different message. Replacing the critical message then has a noticeable effect on the probability distribution of the final outcome; this effect cannot be mimicked by the simulator in the ideal model.
Known Results in the Computational Case
In [6] , Blum gave a computationally secure coin toss protocol. In [14, Proposition 7.4.8] , this protocol is shown to be stand-alone simulatable, and together with the sequential composition theorem [14, Proposition 7.4.3] for stand-alone simulatable protocols, this gives a computationally stand-alone simulatable protocol for tossing polynomially many coins. This makes coin toss extension trivial in that setting; one just ignores the m-bit coin toss and tosses n-bit from scratch.
In the computational universal composability setting, it has been shown in [8] that coin toss cannot be achieved from scratch. However, they showed that a sufficiently large common random string (CRS) implies (an arbitrary number of) ideal bit commitments. Such ideal bit commitments allow to implement a coin toss of arbitrary length (e.g., using Blum's protocol [6] ). Thus, a sufficiently large CRS (and therefore, also a sufficiently large coin toss) can be extended to any polynomial length. However, it was unclear what the minimum size required from the CRS or the coin toss is.
Note that there is a subtle difference between the notion of a CRS and a coin toss. A CRS is randomness that is available to all parties at the beginning of the protocol, while with coin toss the randomness is only generated when all parties agree to run the coin toss. This makes the coin toss actually the stronger primitive, since in some situations, it is necessary to guarantee that not even corrupted parties learn the outcomes of the coin toss prior to a given protocol step.
In [11] , the task of coin toss is considered in a scenario slightly different from ours. 1 Cleve [11] shows that in their setting, coin toss is generally not possible even against computationally limited adversaries. However, to the best of our knowledge, an extension of a given coin toss (in any setting) has not been considered so far in the computational setting.
Our Results in the Computational Case
We show that under suitable (and plausible) computational assumptions, it is possible to extend any coin toss of superlogarithmic length m. (Recall that if m is not superlogarithmic, we show-unconditionally-that coin toss extension is not possible. Hence, this positive result complements our negative result from Theorem 8, albeit under certain computational assumptions.) More specifically, [9] show that when assuming the existence of (polynomially secure) dense pseudorandom permutations, an m-bit coin toss (for linear m) can be used to implement (arbitrarily many) bit commitments. These bit commitments can then be used in the coin-tossing protocol of Blum [6] to derive arbitrarily many fresh random coins. We show (in Theorem 7) that suitably scaling the security parameter of this construction, an m-bit coin toss can be extended for any superlogarithmic m, assuming exponentially strong dense pseudorandom permutations. We leave it as an open problem to find coin toss extension protocols under weaker assumptions.
CRS Extension
A common random string (CRS) can be considered to be cryptographically weaker than a coin toss functionality. The random string of a coin toss functionality is chosen only after both parties have initiated the functionality. A CRS does not give such a guarantee and the adversary may know the value of the CRS from the start. Our coin toss extension protocol from Theorem 14 strongly depends on this guarantee; it is vital that the adversary cannot make his choices dependent on the seed before both parties have initiated the choice of the seed. Hence, the results for coin toss extension do not immediately apply to the task of CRS extension.
A natural question is under which conditions a given CRS can be extended. In this work, we give a characterization, summarized in Table 2 .
Differences to the case of coin toss extension are printed in boldface. A CRS extension is impossible in the case of statistical stand-alone simulatability even for long seeds. To 1 In [11] , parties may not abort protocol execution without generating output. In contrast, in our setting, a party may abort at any time, for example, when detecting a cheating other party, or when it becomes clear that the overall output may be undesirable. We note that in this setting without aborts, any secure coin toss must be "fair," in the sense that a party is guaranteed to obtain a random output. show the impossibility, we look at the protocol after the CRS has been chosen. Given a concrete CRS s to extend, some bits of the protocol outcome should be undetermined at the start of the protocol. Otherwise, the resulting extended CRS would have at most the entropy of s. However, given a concrete CRS s, the situation for the undetermined bits is similar to a coin toss from scratch. These bits can be biased by Alice, or they can be biased by Bob. This proof illustrates the difference between a coin toss and a CRS.
Recall that in the coin toss case, a given m-bit coin toss can be moved to the end of a coin toss extension protocol without loss of generality. We stress, however, that the choice of a CRS always happens at the beginning of the protocol. For the computational case, the results correspond to the findings for coin toss extension (with roughly the same proofs).
Notation
-A function f is non-negligible if it is not negligible, i.e., if there is a c > 0 such that f (k) > k −c for infinitely many k (not to be confused with noticeable). -f is noticeable, if for some c > 0, f (k) ≥ k −c for sufficiently large k. Note that functions exist that are neither negligible nor noticeable.
It is easy to see that f is superlogarithmic if and only if 2 − f is negligible.
Security Definitions
In this section, we roughly sketch the security definitions used throughout this paper. We distinguish between two notions: stand-alone simulatability as defined in [14] 2 and universal composability (UC) as defined in [7] .
Stand-alone Simulatability
In [14] , a definition for the security of two-party secure function evaluations is given (called security in the malicious model). We will give a sketch; for more details, we refer to [14] .
A protocol consists of two parties that alternatingly send messages to each other. The parties may also invoke an ideal functionality as an oracle. In our case, the parties invoke a smaller coin toss to realize a larger one. We remark that the ideal functionality can only be invoked once. Thus, in our case, the parties have only access to one smaller coin toss.
We say the protocol π stand-alone simulatably realizes a probabilistic function f , if for any efficient adversary A that may replace none or a single party, there is an efficient simulator S such that for all inputs, the following random variables are computationally indistinguishable:
-The real protocol execution This consists of the view of the corrupted parties upon inputs x 1 and x 2 for the parties and the auxiliary input z for the adversary, together with the outputs I of the parties. -The ideal protocol execution Here, the simulator first learns the auxiliary input z and possibly the input for the corrupted party (the simulator must corrupt the same party as the adversary). Then, he can choose the input of the corrupted party for the probabilistic function f , and the other inputs are chosen honestly (i.e., the first input is x 1 if the first party is uncorrupted, and the second input x 2 if the second party is). Then, the simulator learns the output I of f (we assume the output to be equal for all parties). It may now generate a fake view v of the corrupted parties. The ideal protocol execution then consists of v and I .
Of course, in our case, the probabilistic function f (the coin toss) has no input, so the above definition gets simpler. What we have sketched above is what we call computational stand-alone simulatability. We further define statistical stand-alone simulatability and perfect stand-alone simulatability. In these cases, we do not consider efficient adversaries and simulators, but computationally unbounded ones. In the case of statistical stand-alone simulatability, we require the real and ideal protocol execution to be statistically (and not only computationally) indistinguishable, and in the perfect case, we even require these distributions to be identical. 2 In fact, Goldreich [14] does not use the name stand-alone simulatability but simply speaks about security in the malicious model. We adopt the name stand-alone simulatability for this paper to be able to better distinguish the different notions.
Universal Composability
In contrast to stand-alone simulatability, universal composability [7] is a much stricter security notion. The main difference is the existence of an environment that may interact with protocol and adversary (or with ideal functionality and simulator) and try to distinguish between real and ideal protocol. This additional strictness brings the advantage of a versatile composition theorem (the UC composition theorem [7] ). We only sketch the model here and refer to [7] for details.
A protocol consists of several machines that may (a) get input from the environment (also during the execution of the protocol), (b) give output to the environment (also during the execution of the protocol), and (c) send messages to each other.
The real protocol execution consists of a protocol π , an adversary A, and an environment Z. Here, the environment may freely communicate with the adversary, and the latter has full control over the network, i.e., it may deliver, delay, or drop messages sent between parties. We assume the authenticated model in this paper, so the adversary learns the content of the messages but may not modify it. When Z terminates, it gives an output. The adversary may choose to corrupt parties at any point in time. 3 The ideal protocol execution is defined analogously, but instead of a protocol π , there is an ideal functionality F, and instead of the adversary, there is a simulator S. The simulator can also corrupt parties, but does not see any inputs/outputs exchanged between uncorrupted parties and the ideal functionality. If the simulator corrupts a party, the simulator can choose all inputs from that party into the functionality and get the corresponding outputs to that party. Uncorrupted parties simply act as relays (or "dummy parties") who forward inputs/outputs between Z and F.
The hybrid protocol execution is defined like the real protocol execution, except that parties also have access to an ideal functionality (also called hybrid functionality in this context), in addition to their ability to communicate over the network. The adversary A controls the network in the same way as in the real protocol execution, but cannot control communication to/from the hybrid functionality (like in the ideal protocol execution). We remark that while Canetti [7] allows parties access to an unbounded number of instances of hybrid functionalities, here we are only interested in protocols that invoke and access at most one instance.
We say a protocol π universally composably (UC-)implements an ideal functionality F (or, if F is clear from the context: That π is universally composable), if for any efficient adversary A, there is an efficient simulator S, such that for all efficient environments Z and all auxiliary inputs z for Z, the distributions of the output of Z in the real 4 and the ideal protocol executions are computationally indistinguishable. 5 What has been sketched above is called computational UC. We further define statistical and perfect UC. In these notions, we allow adversary, simulator, and environment to be computationally unbounded machines. Further, in the case of perfect UC, we require 3 If the adversary always only corrupts parties before the start of the protocol, it is called static. Otherwise, the adversary is called adaptive. The results in this paper hold for both types of adversaries, resp., corruptions. 4 Or, if π uses a hybrid functionality, in the hybrid execution. 5 In the original UC definition of [7] , the output of Z is restricted to a single bit. However, our definition (with a potentially multi-bit output) will be more convenient for our purposes and is easily seen equivalent to the one-bit definition from [7] .
the distributions of the output bit of Z to be identical in real/hybrid and ideal protocol executions.
The Ideal Functionality for Coin Toss
To describe the task of implementing a universally composable coin toss, we have to define the ideal functionality of n-bit coin toss. In the following, let n denote a positive integer-valued function.
Below is an informal description of our ideal functionality for a n-bit coin toss. First, the functionality waits for initialization inputs from both parties P 1 and P 2 . 6 As soon as both parties have this way signaled their willingness to start, the functionality selects n coins in the form of an n-bit string κ uniformly and sends this κ to the adversary. (Note that a coin toss does not guarantee secrecy of any kind.) 7 A more detailed description follows:
Ideal functionality CT n (n-bit Coin Toss)
1. Wait until there have been "init" inputs from P 1 and P 2 . Ignore messages from the adversary, but immediately inform the adversary about the init. 2. Select κ ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly and send κ to the adversary. From now on:
-on the first (and only the first) "deliver to 1" message from the adversary, send κ to P 1 , -on the first (and only the first) "deliver to 2" message from the adversary, send κ to P 2 .
We will consider protocols that implement CT n (either in the sense of stand-alone or UC security). Unfortunately, the trivial protocol (that never generates any output) implements any functionality. (The corresponding simulator simply never delivers any outputs.) Hence, we require the following definition (see also [9] and [2, Sect. 5.1]): Definition 1. A two-party protocol π is non-trivial if the probability is overwhelming that both parties generate identical outputs in a setting in which both parties are honest and all messages are delivered. π is perfectly non-trivial if that probability is zero.
Using CT n , we can also formally express what we mean by extending a coin toss. Namely: Definition 2. Let n = n(k) and m = m(k) be positive, polynomially bounded, and computable functions such that m(k) < n(k) for all k. Then, a protocol is a universally composable (m → n)-coin toss extension protocol if it is non-trivial and securely implements CT n by having access only to a single instance of CT m . This security can be computational, statistical, or perfect.
The Ideal Functionality for Common Random Strings
In Sect. 5, we will also consider the extension of common reference strings. The difference between a common random string (CRS) and a coin toss is subtle but important. Both the coin toss and the CRS produce a uniform random bit string of a certain length and make it available to all parties. In the case of the CRS, this random bit string is publicly available at the beginning of the protocol. In the case of a coin toss, however, the random bit string is published only when both parties explicitly initialize the coin toss. Therefore, the coin toss is the stronger primitive: The security of a protocol can be based on the fact that the value of the coin toss is not known before a certain point in time. For example, the protocol given in the upcoming proof of Theorem 13 explicitly uses that the values a and b chosen by Alice and Bob do not depend on the seed s returned by the coin toss. Thus, this protocol would not be secure when using a CRS instead of a coin toss.
In the following, we analyze which of the results given in the preceding sections apply to the problem of extending a CRS, that is, of producing a longer CRS from a shorter CRS.
Ideal functionality CRS n (n-bit CRS)
1. In the first activation, select κ ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly and send κ to the adversary. 2. When receiving getcrs from party P 1 or P 2 , inform the adversary. 3. When receiving deliver to i from the adversary for some i ∈ {1, 2}, and P i did already send getcrs, send κ to P i .
Definition 3.
Let n = n(k) and m = m(k) be positive, polynomially bounded, and computable functions such that m(k) < n(k) for all k. Then, a protocol is a universally composable (m → n)-CRS extension protocol if it securely and non-trivially implements CRS n by having access only to CRS m . This security can be computational, statistical, or perfect.
On Unbounded Simulators
Following [3] , we have modeled statistical and perfect stand-alone and UC security using computationally unbounded simulators. Another approach is to require the simulators to be polynomial in the running time of the adversary. Our results also hold in such a model. For the impossibility results, this is straightforward, since the security notion gets stricter when the simulators become more restricted. The only possibility result for statistical/perfect security is given in Theorem 14. There, the simulator we construct is in fact polynomial in the runtime of the adversary.
In the following sections, we investigate the existence of such coin toss extension protocols, depending on the desired security level (i.e., computational / statistical / perfect security) and the parameters n and m.
Coin Toss Extension: The Computational Case

Universal Composability
In this section, we present two positive results (combined in Theorem 7) and a negative result (Theorem 8). Our positive results state that as long as m is superlogarithmic, we can achieve coin toss extension (under a computational assumption, whose strength depends on m). Our negative result states that for non-superlogarithmic m, no coin toss extension is possible (unconditionally).
In the following, we start with our positive results and first need to introduce the corresponding computational assumption. Specifically, we need the assumption of (doubly-) enhanced trapdoor permutations with pseudorandom public keys (called ETDs henceforth). Roughly, these are trapdoor permutations with the additional properties that (i) one can sample an image of the permutation in an oblivious fashion, i.e., even given the coins used for sampling of the image, it is infeasible to invert the function, (ii) one can sample a uniform preimage along with the random coins needed to sample the corresponding image, and (iii) the public keys are computationally indistinguishable from random strings.
We inherit the assumption that ETDs exist from [9] (they use it for the case of a uniform CRS). Although we are not aware of any concrete candidates for ETDs, that assumption seems plausible.
We will show that when ETDs exist, then so do efficient protocols for extending a suitably long coin toss. The idea is simple: First, a suitably long coin toss trivially implements a common random string (CRS), from which we can bootstrap a UC-secure multi-use bit commitment protocol using the techniques of [9] . (This is captured in Lemmas 5 and 6.) Next, the UC-secure bit commitment protocol can be used to implement any polynomially long coin toss, using Blum's coin toss protocol [6] . (This is detailed in Theorem 7.)
We start off with the definition of ETDs. The definition of ETDs follows that of doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations in [15] ; only the requirement for pseudorandom public keys has been added.
Definition 4. (Doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations with pseudorandom public keys)
A system of doubly enhanced 8 trapdoor permutations with pseudorandom public keys (ETD) consists of the following efficient algorithms: a key generation algorithm I that (given security parameter k) generates public keys pk and corresponding trapdoors td (we treat pk and td as efficiently computable functions to facilitate notation) and a domain sampling algorithm S that given pk outputs an element in the domain of pk. Additionally, the ETD defines a set of valid public keys. I, S must satisfy the following conditions:
For any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there is a negligible function μ such that the following conditions are satisfied:
pk is a valid public key and td = pk −1 ≥ 1− μ(k), and any valid public key is a permutation.
-Almost uniform sampling. For any valid public key pk in the range of I (1 k ), the statistical distance between the output of S(pk) and randomly chosen elements in the domain (=range) of pk is bounded by μ(k).
Here, r denotes the randomness used by S. -Doubly enhanced There exists an efficient algorithm that, on input a valid public key pk, outputs (x, r ) with pk(x) = S(pk), where r denotes the randomness used by S and is distributed uniformly. In other words, it is efficiently possible to sample a preimage x along with the random coins needed to choose the image pk(x). -Pseudorandom public keys There is a polynomially bounded, efficiently computable function s (not depending on A) such that
An ETD is exponentially hard if for every subexponential-time A, there exists an exponentially small μ such that all of the above conditions (i.e., permutations, almost uniform sampling, enhanced hardness, doubly enhanced, and pseudorandom public keys) hold.
Lemma 5. There is a constant d ∈ N such that the following holds for all polynomially bounded functions s computable in time polynomial in k:
Assume that ETD exists such that the size of the circuits describing the ETD is bounded by s(k) for security parameter k. 9 Then, there is a protocol π using a uniform common random string (CRS) of length s(k) d such that π securely UC-realizes a bit commitment that can be used polynomially many times.
Proof. The main work (i.e., finding the protocol and proving its security) has been done in [9] . It is left to show that for their construction, a CRS of length poly(s) is sufficient. By poly(s), we mean a polynomially bounded function in s that is independent of the chosen ETD. (In [9] , it is only shown that a CRS of length p(k) is sufficient, where k is the security parameter and p a polynomial depending on the ETD.)
In [9] , there is a protocol UAHC that, assuming a CRS and the existence of ETD, implements multiple commitments. 10 The CRS is assumed to contain the following: (i) 9 By the size of the circuits, we means the total size of the circuits describing both the key generation and the domain sampling algorithm. Note that then trivially also the size of the resulting keys and the amount of randomness used by the domain sampling algorithm are bounded by s(k). 10 Canetti et al. [9] state their result with respect to enhanced, not doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations.
This is due to the fact that, at the time, it was believed that enhanced trapdoor permutations are sufficient a random image under a one-way function f k (that depends on the security parameter k), (ii) a public key for a semantically secure cryptosystem E, and (iii) a public key for a CCA2-secure cryptosystem E cca . We discuss how to instantiate f k , E, E cca so that we get a CRS that is indistinguishable from uniform. The one-way function f may be constructed from the ETD as follows: f interprets its input r as randomness to be used in the ETD key generation algorithm and outputs the resulting public key. Then, for security parameter k, the images of f have length s 1 ≤ s (since they are public keys). Further, since the public keys are indistinguishable from uniform randomness by definition of the ETD, random images of f are computationally indistinguishable from s 1 -bit randomness.
Second, a semantically secure cryptosystem E can be constructed from the ETD using the construction from [16, 17] . Then, the public key for E is just a public key for the ETD. It follows that the length of the public keys is s 1 (k), and random public keys are indistinguishable from s 1 -bit randomness.
The construction of E cca is more involved but still standard. Specifically, we use the construction by Dolev et al. [12] . For this, we first need a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK) to prove consistency of a ciphertext. For instance, [13, Constructions 4.10.4 and 4.10.7] together with the additional remarks in [15] present a suitable scheme, based on doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations. We will now examine the size of the CRS needed for that protocol. To prove a statement that is described by a circuit of size s 2 , the CRS consists-for one iteration of the proof-of poly(s 2 ) commitments to random bits using a trapdoor permutation. The length of each commitment is O(s) since s bounds the size of the circuits describing the trapdoor permutation scheme. To guarantee soundness, poly(s 2 ) · m parallel executions of the scheme are necessary (using the same trapdoor permutation, see [13, Construction 4.10.4] ), where m is a superlogarithmic function in the security parameter. So if we choose m := s, the length of the CRS used by the NIZK scheme is bounded by poly(s(k)+s 2 (k)). The CRS consists of images of uniformly random preimages under a permutation; thus, it is uniformly random.
Another ingredient we need is a universal family of one-way hash functions. In [25] (see also [18, 22] ), a scheme is presented that converts a one-way function f into a universal family of one-way hash functions. Here, the image of the hash function has length s 3 ∈ poly(s 4 ), where s 4 is the length of the images of f . And if the one-way function is keyless, so is the hash function. If we use the keyless one-way functions f constructed above, s 4 ≤ s, and the one-way hash is keyless. Now, we come back to the construction of E cca . In this construction, the public key consists of (i) a hash function h from the abovementioned family (s 3 bit), (ii) 2s 4 public keys for a semantically secure encryption scheme, say the scheme E constructed above (2s 4 s 1 bit), and (iii) a CRS for the NIZK scheme above to show a statement that can be described by a circuit of size polynomial in 2s 4 and the size of the circuits describing the trapdoor permutation scheme (that is bounded by s). So the CRS has a length of at Footnote 10 continued for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. It was, however, pointed out in [15] (following an observation by Jonathan Katz) that this is not the case. In particular, we stress that also [9] actually require the existence of doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations. In case of a uniform CRS, in fact ETDs according to Definition 4 are required. most poly(s + s 4 ) bit. Putting this together, and noting that s 4 ≤ s, we see that the public key of E cca has a length in s 3 + 2s 4 s 1 + poly(s + s 4 ) = poly(s).
Since the key of the hash function we constructed is a zero bit string (the hash function is keyless), and the public key of E as well as the CRS of the NIZK scheme is indistinguishable from uniform, the public key of E cca is also indistinguishable from uniform.
Finally, the protocol UAHC from [9] uses a CRS consisting of a public key for E, a public key for E cca , and an image of f . By our calculations above, the total length of that CRS lies in poly(s), and the CRS is indistinguishable from uniform.
Let π be the protocol that results from UAHC by using a uniformly random string of length poly(s). Since the new CRS is indistinguishable from the old CRS, and since UAHC is a UC-secure commitment, the protocol π is also UC-secure commitment with uniform CRS.
Lemma 6. Let s(k) be a polynomially bounded function that is computable in time polynomial in k.
Assume one of the following holds:
-ETD exists and s is a polynomially large function.
-Exponentially hard ETD exists and s is a superpolylogarithmic function.
Then, there also exists an ETD, such that the size of the circuits describing the ETD is bounded by s(k) for security parameter k.
Proof. This is shown by scaling the security parameter of the original ETD. Let I be the key generation algorithm and S be the sampling algorithm of the ETD. Since I and S are efficient algorithms, there is a c ∈ N such that the size of the circuits of (I, S) is bounded by k c . Then, sets(k) := s(k) 1/c . Obviously, if s is superpolylogarithmic or polynomially large, respectively, then so iss. We now construct a new scheme (I , S ) as follows: I (k ) := I (s(k )) and S := S. Then, for security parameter k , the circuits of (I , S ) have sizes(k ) c ≤ s(k ), as required. It is left to show that (I , S ) is a system of ETD.
We will use the following notation: When talking about the original ETD (I, S), we will use the names from Definition 4 (e.g., A, k, μ). When talking about (I , S ), we will add a prime (e.g., A , k , μ ).
Let a polynomial-time algorithm A be given. We then construct a machine A as follows: Upon input 1 k , A chooses k to be a uniform k withs(k ) = k (i.e., k is uniformly chosen from the sets −1 ({k})).
After k is chosen, A runs A (1 k ). As we will show below, A runs in polynomial time (or subexponential time in the case of exponentially hard ETD). So there is a negligible (or exponentially small) μ with respect to which all conditions in Definition 4 hold. Let
Then, by construction, all the conditions in Definition 4 also hold for A , μ , and the modified system (I , S ) (to see this, simply substitutes(k ) for k and take into account the uniform choice of k overs −1 (k)). Since μ is negligible if μ is negligible or exponentially bounded, respectively (as we will show below), it follows that (I , S ) is a system for ETD. It is left to show that A runs in polynomial time (or subexponential time in the case of exponentially hard ETD) and that μ is negligible.
First, we show that A runs in polynomial/subexponential time in k. Since A simulates A in time polynomial ink := maxs −1 ({k}), it is sufficient to show thatk is polynomially bounded (or subexponential, respectively) in k. We distinguish two cases. Case 1: Ifs is polynomially large, then there is a d such thats
Case 2,s is superpolylogarithmic: Let d ∈ N be arbitrary. Sinces is superpolylogarithmic, there exists
for sufficiently large k. Since d ∈ N was arbitrary, this shows thatk is subexponential in k.
It remains to show that μ is negligible. As a preparation, note that
Now in the first case (wheres and s are polynomially large), μ is negligible. Sinces is polynomially large and computable in polynomial time, there exist d, e ∈ N such that for sufficiently large k , it is
is negligible.
In the second case,s is superpolylogarithmic and μ is exponentially small. Hence,
for any k . We now show that μ (k ) is negligible. To this end, we set c := 3/d and thus derive
for sufficiently large k , where ( * ) follows from the assumption thats is superpolylogarithmic. Thus, μ (k ) is negligible in k as desired. 
Given n-bit commitments, the following protocol π UC-realizes an n-bit coin toss (based on the protocol of [6] ):
Now consider the coin toss extension protocol from Fig. 1 . It is easy to see that this protocol UC-realizes an n-bit coin toss. We sketch the simulator S: As soon as all uncorrupted parties got input (init), S learns what value r the ideal n-bit coin toss has. When P 1 is or gets corrupted, S learns the value r 1 as soon as P 1 commits, so the simulated r 2 can be chosen as r 1 ⊕r . When P 2 is or gets corrupted, but P 1 is uncorrupted at least during the commitment to r 1 , the simulator S unveils value r 1 to r 2 ⊕ r . In the case that both parties get corrupted, the environment does not learn the value from the ideal coin toss, so the simulator can simply choose it to be r 1 ⊕ r 2 .
Furthermore, an m-bit CRS can be trivially implemented using an m-bit coin toss. Using the UC composition theorem [7] , we can put the above constructions together and get a protocol that UC-realizes an n-bit coin toss using an m-bit coin toss.
Note that given stronger, but possibly unrealistic assumptions, the lower bound for m in Theorem 7 can be decreased. If we assume that for any superlogarithmic m, there is ETD such that the size of their circuits is bounded by m 1/d (where d is the constant from Lemma 5), we get coin toss extension even for superlogarithmic m (using the same proof as for Theorem 7, except that instead of Lemma 6, we use the stronger assumption).
However, we cannot expect an even better lower bound for m, as the following theorem shows: We first give a proof sketch. We note that our proof generalizes a similar result from [8] (that shows Theorem 8 for m = 0). Canetti [8] argue that a hypothetical simulator for coin toss would have to be able to "convince" the other party of an arbitrary outcome of the coin toss. We show that a similar property holds even when an ideal (but short) m-bit coin toss is available.
More specifically, first, we recall how the impossibility of a universally composable coin toss is shown in the case that we have no seed (i.e., without the functionality CT m ). Assume for contradiction that a protocol π with parties P 1 and P 2 exists such that π implements CT n . (Here, n is as in the theorem.) Then, assume an adversary A 1 that corrupts P 1 and simply reroutes all communication with P 1 to the environment. (E.g., messages sent by P 2 are forwarded to the environment; cf. also the left-hand side of Fig. 2. ) Assume an environment Z 1 that internally simulates an instance P 1 of P 1 and instructs A 1 to forward the messages produced by the simulated P 1 . The outputs made by P 1 and P 2 we call κ 1 and κ 2 , respectively. Since the network consisting of Z 1 , A 1 , and P 2 essentially is an honest execution of π , we have that with overwhelming probability, κ 1 and κ 2 are n-bit strings and κ 1 = κ 2 . Z 1 outputs 1 iff κ 1 = κ 2 ; thus, Z 1 outputs 1 with overwhelming probability when running with π and A 1 as above.
Since we assume that π is universally composable, there is a simulator S 1 that simulates the adversary A 1 . That is, Z 1 cannot distinguish between A 1 with P 2 (the real model) and S 1 with CT n (the ideal model). Since A 1 just forwards messages from P 2 , the simulator S 1 effectively produces a simulation of P 2 's messages. Furthermore, in the ideal model, Z 1 gets the n-bit string κ 2 from CT n . Since Z 1 cannot distinguish between the real and the ideal models, we have that κ 1 = κ 2 with overwhelming probability also in the ideal model. This implies that S 1 is a machine that manages to make P 1 (which is identical to the honest party P 1 ) output an externally given n-bit string κ 2 . This, however, violates the assumption that P 1 is part of a secure coin toss protocol. In a secure coin toss protocol, S 1 would succeed only with probability 2 −m in making P 1 output κ 2 . Thus, our assumption that π was a universally composable coin toss protocol is false. Now consider the case where we additionally have an m-bit seed ω given by the ideal functionality CT m used in the real model by P 1 and P 2 . In this case, the simulator S 1 is allowed to simulate the value ω. Thus, S 1 now is a machine that can make the honest party P 1 output an externally given n-bit string κ 2 if S 1 is allowed to choose the seed ω. If S 1 may not choose the seed ω, it will only succeed if the seed ω accidentally is the one that S 1 would have chosen. This happens with probability 2 −m . Thus, S 1 manages to make P 1 output an externally given value κ with probability 2 −m (up to a negligible error). However, since π is a secure coin toss protocol, S 1 should succeed with probability at most 2 −n (up to a negligible error). Since the difference between 2 −n and 2 −m is non-negligible (as n is not superlogarithmic), it follows Z 1 can distinguish between the real model and the ideal model with S 1 . Thus, π is not universally composable.
We proceed with the full proof.
Proof (of Theorem 8).
We use the notation from the proof sketch. So assume for contradiction that π , using CT m , implements CT n . We start with a network C 1 of machines as in a real protocol run with corrupted P 1 . More specifically, C 1 consists of a party P 2 , a helping coin toss functionality CT m , an adversary A 1 that takes the role of a corrupted P 1 , and an environment Z 1 . Note that the corrupted party P 1 has been removed, since it is taken over by the adversary. The machine A 1 simply relays the connections of the corrupted P 1 to Z 1 . That is, every message sent from CT m or P 2 to the corrupted P 1 is forwarded to Z 1 , and A 1 lets Z 1 send messages to CT m or P 2 in the name of P 1 . Now Z 1 in turn internally simulates an instance P 1 of party P 1 and lets this simulation take part in the protocol through A 1 . Additionally, Z 1 simulates a machine Z. That machine Z only gives "init" inputs to the parties P 1 and P 2 and then collects their outputs. At the end of the execution, Z gives output 1 iff both parties give output and both outputs are identical. The output is passed through by Z 1 . The situation is depicted in Fig. 2 .
Our first claim is that in runs of this network C 1 , eventually identical κ 1 and κ 2 are observed by Z 1 with overwhelming probability. Indeed, by definition of CT n , in an ideal protocol run with no corruptions, the outputs κ 1 and κ 2 must be identical if both are output. Since π UC-implements CT n , this must also hold with overwhelming probability in runs of the real protocol without corruptions. Since protocol π is non-trivial, in such a case output is guaranteed, and we have thus κ 1 = κ 2 with overwhelming probability. This carries over to C 1 , since C 1 is formed from an uncorrupted real protocol simply by relaying some messages through A 1 and by regrouping machines. So in C 1 , Z 1 gives output 1 with overwhelming probability. Now since π UC-implements CT n , there must be a simulator S 1 in the ideal setting with CT n that simulates attacks carried out by A 1 . In our situation (depicted in Fig. 2 ), this simulator must in particular achieve that κ 1 = κ 2 with overwhelming probability. In other words, S 1 must "convince" the simulation of P 1 to output the κ 1 that was chosen by the ideal CT n . To this end, S 1 may make up an initial seed ω 1 from a machine CT m that is actually not present in the ideal model. Also, S 1 may make up suitable responses from a faked party P 2 (that is also not present in the ideal model) in communication with P 1 . Call this network (consisting of S 1 , CT n , and Z 1 ) C 2 . Since the probability that Z gave output 1 was overwhelming in C 1 , the same holds for C 2 by the definition of UC security.
Now we modify network C 2 . First, we regroup machines and make the simulation P 1 of P 1 a machine of its own. (This machine is then identical to P 1 .) Then, we introduce a new machine CT m that ideally selects and delivers an ω 1 to P 1 . (In C 2 , P 1 got that value from S 1 .) Both the seed ω 2 output by CT m and the seed ω 1 output by S 1 are simply collected by a dummy machine * that discards them. The resulting network is called C 3 and depicted in Fig. 3 .
The networks C 2 and C 3 provide completely identical views for P 1 when ω 1 = ω 1 in C 3 . This again happens with probability 2 −m by definition. Since in C 2 , the environment Z gave output 1 with some overwhelming probability p, it follows that in C 3 the probability is at least 2 −m (1 − p) = 2 −m − μ for some negligible μ. Now comes the crucial part: We combine Z, S 1 , CT n , and the dummy machine * (that is to say, all machines but P 1 and CT m ) into a protocol environment Z 2 . A new real adversary is added that only relays the connection between S 1 and P 1 and the connection between * and CT m .
This regrouping of machines gives a new network C 4 (cf. Fig. 3 ). Note that C 4 is only a regrouping of C 3 (followed by the insertion of a machine A 2 ) that just forwards messages, and hence it still holds that Z gives output 1 with probability 2 −m − μ. Note further that C 4 actually is the network in which A 2 corrupts the party P 2 in the real protocol π and runs with environment Z 2 .
Now since π UC-implements CT n , there must be a simulator S 2 that in an ideal setting with CT n simulates the situation from network C 4 . (Here, we use the different name CT n only to avoid conflicting names with the CT n -instance inside Z 2 ). This simulator simulates attacks carried out by A 2 on the real protocol. The network consisting of S 2 , Z 2 , and CT n we call C 5 ; see Fig. 4 .
In particular, this simulator achieves that the probability of Z outputting 1 is negligibly less than in the real setting C 4 . However, in C 4 this probability has a lower bound of 2 −m − μ for some negligible μ. On the other hand, in the ideal setting of C 5 , both κ 1 and κ 2 are chosen in an ideal manner as independent uniform n-bit strings by instances of the functionality CT n . So the probability that κ 1 = κ 2 in C 5 is at most 2 −n (note that it is also possible that no output is generated), and therefore the probability of an 1-output in C 5 is bounded by 2 −n . So the difference between the probabilities that Z outputs 1 in runs of C 4 and C 5 is at least
which is not negligible since m is not superlogarithmic. This contradicts the fact derived above that the difference of the probabilities is negligible. So π cannot securely implement an n-bit coin toss.
Coin Toss Extension: The Statistical and the Perfect Case
A Technical Lemma
We first show that we can make certain simplifying assumptions about the protocols we consider.
Lemma 9. If there is a non-trivial (computationally, statistically, or perfectly) standalone secure (resp. universally composable) protocol for (m → n)-coin toss extension, then there is also (a potentially inefficient) one in which -in the honest case, both parties either output the same bit string z ∈ {0, 1} n , or both parties output nothing (in which case, we write z = ⊥), -this output z (for the honest parties) is a deterministic function of the messages sent and the value s of the m-bit coin toss, -each party sends in each protocol run at most one message to CT m , and this is always an "init" message, -the internal state of each of the two parties consists only of the messages exchanged
(with the other party and CT m ) so far, 11 and -after P i sends "init" to CT m , it does not further communicate with P 3−i (for i = 1, 2 and in case of no corruptions).
Proof. First, we modify a given protocol as follows, to enforce the first two requirements: Each party sends a confirmation messages at the end, where it tells the other party what it is going to output. If these exchanged values do not match, both parties output nothing. The same modification also achieves that the outcome is a deterministic function of the protocol transcript and the used m-bit coin toss s. This modification only suppresses outputs in certain cases and thus can be simulated perfectly, without any simulation error. Next, straightforward syntactic modifications show that we can assume that each party sends at most one message to CT m in each run, and this is always an "init" message. (Other messages to CT m would be ignored anyway.) An application of Lemma 21 further shows we can assume that the internal state each party consists only of the messages exchanged so far with the other party and CT m . The remaining transformation modifies π such that no further communication between P 1 and P 2 is necessary after CT m has been invoked.
First, we change each P i (for i ∈ {1, 2}) so as to signal the other party P 3−i before it sends an "init" message to CT m . Then, P i proceeds to send "init" to CT m only after it has received an acknowledgement message from P 3−i . We call the modified protocol π 1 . It is easy to see that π 1 statistically implements (resp., UC-implements) the original protocol π . The simulator only has to produce the additional message "init"; he can do so because the functionality CT m informs him when it is invoked. Second, each P i is modified to wait for CT m -output as soon as P i itself has sent "init" to CT m and P 3−i has also signaled to do so. All messages from P 3−i are buffered and processed by P i only when that CT m -output arrives. This protocol π 2 implements (resp., UC-implements) π 1 (and by transitivity also π ) since the modified behavior of the π 2 -parties can be simulated by a simulator in π 1 simply by delaying message delivery in π 1 . Now comes the interesting part: We modify each P i so as to postpone the "init" message to CT m to the end of the protocol run. Instead, P i carries on with π 2 as if it had sent "init." When it goes into the waiting state (for CT m -output ω, which will now certainly not arrive), it immediately leaves that waiting state. Then, P i makes 2 m copies of its current internal state and carries on with 2 m parallel executions of π 2 . In execution number j (0 ≤ j < 2 m ), P i behaves as if it had gotten a seed ω = j from CT m . At the end of the protocol run, when all the parallel executions have fixed their output, P i then queries CT m with an "init" message and waits for a seed ω to arrive. Finally, P i outputs whatever the ωth execution of the parallelized protocol would have output. 12 Call the protocol with these modified parties π 3 .
This protocol obviously fulfills the requirements in the lemma statement, and it only remains to show that π 3 implements (resp. UC-implements) π 2 (and thus π ) and hence is a stand-alone secure (resp., universally composable) protocol for coin toss extension. We sketch a simulator S that simulates attacks (performed by a an adversary A) on π 3 in the setting of π 2 . Recall that π 3 and π 2 proceed identically until CT m is queried (which causes S to be notified by CT m ). Hence, S can proceed like A until then.
Once a party queries CT m in π 3 , however, that party internally forks into 2 m parallel executions, one for each possible CT m (as described above). In interacting with π 2 , S will only see one of those protocol executions, namely the one for the actual CT moutput. Hence, in order to simulate π 3 , S will have to simulate an additional 2 m − 1 instances of (the remaining part of) π 2 . However, S can easily start and maintain such simulations, since the state of the corresponding parties (which only consists of the exchanged messages and the hypothetical CT m -output for that instance) is known.
Stand-alone Simulatability
Negative Results
Theorem 10. Let m < n be functions in the security parameter k. Assume that m is not superlogarithmic. There is no (efficient or inefficient) non-trivial (in the sense of Definition 1) two-party (m → n)-bit coin toss extension protocol with the following property: -For any (possibly unbounded) adversary corrupting one of the parties, there is a negligible function μ such that for every security parameter k and every c ∈ {0, 1} n , the probability for protocol output c is at most 2 −n + μ(k).
If we require perfect non-triviality and perfect security (the probability for a given output c is at most 2 −n ), no such a protocol π exists for any m (even superlogarithmic m).
Note that the notion of security used in this theorem is intentionally very weak. For example, if the first bit of the outcome is 0, and all other bits are uniformly random (and n is superlogarithmic), this notion of security is satisfied. Since the theorem is an impossibility result, using a weaker security notion strengthens the theorem. In Corollary 11, we will instead use the familiar simulation-based security notions.
We start with a proof sketch for the first statement (for the non-perfect case with non-superlogarithmic m).
Using Lemma 9 (and the fact that an n-bit coin toss immediately implies an m-bit coin toss for any m < n), we may assume that -the available m-bit coin toss is only used at the end of the protocol, -in the honest case, the parties never output distinct or invalid values, and -n = m + 1.
To show the theorem, we first consider "complete transcripts" of the protocol. By a complete transcript, we mean all messages sent during the run of a protocol, but excluding the value of the m-bit coin toss. We define three sets of complete transcripts:
-the set A of transcripts having nonzero probability for the protocol output 0 n , -the set B of transcripts having zero probability of output 0 n and zero probability that the protocol gives no output, -and the set C of transcripts having nonzero probability of giving no output.
Since for a complete transcript, the protocol output only depends on the m-bit coin toss, any of the nonzero probabilities in the definitions of A, B, C is at least 2 −m . Besides, by definition, B = {0, 1} n \ (A ∪ C), but A and C need not be disjoint.
For any partial transcript p (i.e., a situation during the run of the protocol), we define three values α, β, and γ . The value α denotes the probability with which a corrupted Alice can enforce a transcript in A starting from p, the value β denotes the probability with which a corrupted Bob can enforce a transcript in B, and the value γ denotes the probability that the complete protocol transcript will lie in C if no one is corrupted. We show inductively that for any partial transcript p, we have (1 − α)(1 − β) ≤ γ . In particular, this holds for the beginning of the protocol. For simplicity, we assume that 2 −m is not only non-negligible, but noticeable (in the full proof, the general case is considered). Since a transcript in C gives no output with probability at least 2 −m , the probability that the protocol generates no output (in the uncorrupted case) is at least 2 −m γ . By the non-triviality condition, this probability is negligible, so γ must be negligible, too. So (1 − α)(1 − β) is negligible, too. Therefore, min {1 − α, 1 − β} must be negligible. For now, we assume that 1 − α is negligible or 1 − β is negligible (for the general case, see the full proof).
If 1 − α is negligible, α is overwhelming. The probability for output 0 n is at least 2 −m α. Since α is overwhelming and 2 −m noticeable, this is greater than 2 −n = 1 2 2 −m by a noticeable amount which contradicts the security property.
If 1 − β is negligible, we have that Bob can ensure an output in {0, 1} n \ {0 n } with overwhelming probability β. By the security property, however, such an output should occur at most with probability (2 n − 1)2 −n plus a negligible amount. (2 n − 1)2 −n = 1−2 −n = 1−2 −m /2 is not overwhelming since m is not superlogarithmic by assumption, so we have a contradiction.
The perfect case is proven similarly.
Proof (of Theorem 10).
We first consider the statistical (i.e., non-perfect) case. Let us assume that such a π exists. Invoking Lemma 9, we can assume the following:
(i) If no party is corrupted, both parties always give the same (or no) output, and this output is a deterministic function of the sent messages, and the value of the used m-bit coin toss. (ii) No messages are sent after invoking the m-bit coin toss. (iii) The honest parties maintain no internal state except for the list of the messages sent so far.
Finally, we assume without loss of generality that n = m + 1. We call the parties Alice and Bob. In the following, by a complete transcript t, we mean (the sequence of) all messages sent during a run of the protocol π , excluding the value s of the m-bit coin toss. The protocol outcome (of the honest parties) is then f (t, s) ∈ {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥} for some deterministic function f . By a partial transcript p, we mean a prefix of a complete transcript. We write p ≤ p to denote that partial transcript p is a prefix of partial transcript p , and we write p < 1 p to denote that p is the immediate prefix of p (i.e., the maximal p ≤ p with of p = p ). Finally, let last( p) denote the last message for a non-empty partial transcript p.
We can now distinguish three sets of complete transcripts t:
We now associate with each of the partial transcript p values α p , β p , and γ p . The value α p is defined as the maximum probability, going over all adversaries, that with corrupted Alice, the complete transcript of the protocol will lie in A, when starting with the partial transcript p (this is well defined, since the honest parties do not maintain a state except for the transcript so far). In other words, α p denotes the probability that a corrupted Alice can enforce a complete transcript in A. Similarly, β p is defined as the maximum probability that the complete transcript will lie in B for corrupted Bob. And finally, γ p is the probability that in the uncorrupted case, the complete transcript will lie in C when starting from p.
Proof of Claim 1. Let first t be a complete transcript. Then, α t , β t , γ t ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, since A ∪ B ∪ C contains all complete transcripts, at least one of α t , β t , γ t is not 0. So, for every complete transcript t, it holds
Now consider a partial transcript p that is not complete. Let us assume that at that point of the protocol, it is Alice's turn to send a message. Consider the set
of partial transcripts that can immediately succeed p. For each i ∈ M p , there is a welldefined probability r i that, given an uncorrupted Alice and a previous partial transcript p, Alice indeed sends last(i). It is i∈M p r i = 1. Then, we have
since a corrupted Alice may choose the partial transcript i that maximizes α, while if only Bob or no one is corrupted, the next partial transcript is chosen according to the probabilities r i prescribed by the protocol. Let us assume that 
where (i), (ii), (iv) follow from the middle, left, and right part of (2), respectively, and (iii) follows from our assumption.
Analogous reasoning can be applied when it is Bob's turn to send a message. By induction, we therefore get (1 − α p )(1 − β p ) ≤ γ p for any partial transcript p. This concludes the proof of Claim 1. Now let ∅ denote the empty partial transcript, i.e., the beginning of the protocol. Then, for α := α ∅ , β := β ∅ , γ := γ ∅ , Claim 1 implies (1 − α)(1 − β) ≤ γ . We will construct a contradiction to the non-triviality and security properties of the protocol, which will finish the proof. Claim 2. 1 − α or 1 − β is negligible on an infinite subset K of security parameters.
Proof of Claim 2.
If a protocol reaches a complete transcript in C, it will output ⊥ with probability at least 2 −m , so the probability that π outputs ⊥ is at least 2 −m γ . On the other hand, since π is non-trivial, the probability that the protocol gives output ⊥ in the uncorrupted case is negligible. Hence, 2 −m γ is negligible. Since 2 −m is non-negligible by assumption, there exists an infinite set K of security parameters k such that 2 −m is noticeable on K . If γ was non-negligible on K , 2 −m γ would be non-negligible on K . So γ must be negligible on K . Since (1 − α)(1 − β) ≥ γ for each k ∈ K , one of 1 − α and 1 − β is bounded by √ γ which is negligible on K . So there is an infinite set K ⊆ K , such that 1 − α is negligible on K or 1 − β is negligible on K . This shows Claim 2.
We can now finish the proof by showing a contradiction to the security of the protocol in either case of Claim 2. Let us consider the first case, i.e., α is overwhelming on K . By assumption, the probability P for protocol output 0 n (with corrupted Alice) is bounded from above by 2 −n + μ for negligible μ. But since a complete transcript in A has probability at least 2 −m of giving output 0 n , we have
Since α is overwhelming and 2 −m noticeable on K , μ is not negligible, which concludes the proof in this case.
Let us consider the second case, i.e., β is overwhelming on K . By assumption, the maximum probability P for an output in {0, 1} n \ {0 n } (with corrupted Bob) is at most 2 −n (2 n − 1) + μ(2 n − 1) for some negligible μ. On the other hand, since a complete transcript in B has probability 1 of giving output in {0, 1} n \ {0 n }, we have P ≥ β. It is
is noticeable on K . Further, 1 − β is negligible, so the lower bound for μ is also noticeable on K . It follows that μ is not negligible, which concludes the proof in the statistical (non-perfect) case.
For the perfect case, the proof of (1 − α)(1 − β) ≤ γ is performed identically (since we did not use the non-triviality and the security of π in that part of the proof). By the perfect non-triviality, we get γ = 0, so for every k, at least one of α, β is 1. If α = 1, the probability for an output of 0 n is (for suitable adversary) ≥ 2 −m > 2 −n . If β = 1, the probability for an output in {0, 1} n \ {0 n } is 1 > (2 n − 1)2 −n . Both cases contradict the security property.
Corollary 11. Let m be not superlogarithmic and n > m. Then, there is no non-trivial (in the sense of Definition 1) protocol realizing n-bit coin toss using an m-bit coin toss in the sense of statistical stand-alone simulatability.
Let m be any function (possibly superlogarithmic) and n > m. Then, there is no perfectly non-trivial protocol realizing n-bit coin toss using an m-bit coin toss in the sense of perfect stand-alone simulatability.
Proof. A statistically secure protocol would have the security property from Theorem 10 and thus, if non-trivial, contradict Theorem 10 analogously for perfect security.
Positive Results
Now we will prove that there exists a protocol for coin toss extension from m to n bits that is statistically stand-alone simulatably secure. The basic idea is to have the parties P 1 and P 2 contribute random strings to generate one string with sufficiently large minentropy (the min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as min x − log Pr[X = x]). The randomness from this string is then extracted using a randomness extractor. The amount of perfect randomness (i.e., the size of the m-bit coin toss) one needs to invest is smaller than the amount extracted. This makes coin toss extension possible.
For our protocol, we need a family of strong randomness extractors with suitable parameters. The following lemma states the existence of these extractors. Here, ·, · denotes the inner product and ⊕ the addition over GF (2) . It is easy to verify that h m (s, ·) constitutes a family of universal hash functions [10] , where s is the index selecting from that family. Therefore, the Leftover Hash Lemma [20, 26] guarantees that the statistical distance between s h m (s, x) and the uniform distribution on {0, 1} m+1 is bounded by
With this family of functions h m , a simple protocol is possible that extends m(k) coin tosses to m(k) + 1 if the function m(k) is superlogarithmic. Proof. Let h m be as in Lemma 12. Then, the following protocol realizes a coin toss extension by one bit. and sends b to P 1 .
3. If one party fails to send a string of appropriate length or aborts, then this string is assumed by the other party to be an all-zero string of the appropriate length. 4. P 1 and P 2 invoke the m-bit coin toss functionality and obtain a uniformly distributed s ∈ {0, 1} m . If one party P i fails to invoke the coin toss functionality or aborts, then the other party chooses s at random. 5. Both P 1 and P 2 compute s h m (s, a b) and output this string.
Note that the protocol is constructed in a way that the adversary is not able to abort the protocol. Hence, we can safely assume that the adversary will send some message of the correct length and will invoke the coin toss functionality. (We follow [14, Construction 7.4.7] in this.) We assume the adversary to corrupt P 2 ; corruption of P 1 is handled analogously. Further, we assume without loss of generality that the random tape t of A to be fixed. (The advantage of a probabilistic adversary is bounded by that of the deterministic adversary with a worst-case random tape.) Due to these assumptions, there exists a function f A : {0, 1} m/2 → {0, 1} m/2 for each real adversary A such that the message b sent in step 2 of the protocol equals f A (a). (Since t is fixed, it does not have to be included as an argument to f A .) There is no loss in generality if we assume the view of the adversary to consist of just a, b, s since the complete view can be reconstructed given these values and the (fixed) random tape t. Now for a specific adversary A with fixed random tape corrupting P 2 , the output distribution of the real protocol (i.e., view and output) is completely described by the following game: Choose a s, a b), and return ((a, b, s), r ) .
We now describe the simulator. To distinguish the random variables in the ideal model from their real counterparts, we decorate them with a ∼, e.g. To show that the simulator is correct, we have to show that the following two distributions are statistically indistinguishable: ((a, b, s) , r ) as defined in the real model, and ((ã,b,s),r ) .
By construction of the simulator, it is obvious that the two distributions are identical under the condition that r m = 0,r m = 0 and that the simulator does not fail. The same holds given r m = 1,r m = 1 and that the simulator does not fail. Therefore, it is sufficient to show two things: (i) The statistical distance between r and the uniform distribution on n bits is negligible, and (ii) the probability that the simulator fails is negligible. Property (i) is shown using the properties of the randomness extractor h m . Since a is chosen at random, the min-entropy of a is at least h m (s,ã b ) in the different invocations of the adversary are independent, the probability that h m (s,ã b ) =r m for all m is negligibly far from 2 −k . So the simulator fails only with negligible probability.
It follows that the real and the ideal protocol executions are indistinguishable, and the protocol stand-alone simulatably implements an (m+1)-bit coin toss.
The idea of the one bit extension protocol can be extended by using an extractor that extracts a larger amount of randomness. This yields constant round coin toss extension protocols. However, the simulator needed for such a protocol does not seem to be efficient, even if the real adversary is. To get a protocol that also fulfills the property of both computational stand-alone simulatability and statistical stand-alone simulatability, we need a simulator that is efficient if the adversary is.
Below, we give such a coin toss extension protocol for superlogarithmic m(k). This protocol is statistically and computationally secure, i.e., the simulator for polynomialtime adversaries is polynomially bounded, too. The basic idea here is to extract one bit at a time in polynomially many rounds. Proof. Let h m be as in Lemma 12. Then, the following protocol realizes a coin toss extension by p(k) bits. and sends b i to P 1 . (c) If one party fails to send a string of appropriate length or aborts, then this string is assumed by the other party to be an all-zero string of the appropriate length.
2. P 1 and P 2 invoke the m-bit coin toss functionality and obtain a uniformly distributed s ∈ {0, 1} m . If one party P i fails to invoke the coin toss functionality or aborts, then the other party chooses s at random. 3. P 1 and P 2 compute s h m (s, a 1 b 1 ) . . . h m (s, a p(k) b p(k) ) and output this string.
We describe the proof for the case of a corrupted P 2 ; for corrupted P 1 , the proof is analogous. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the adversary computes the values b i by evaluating b i : = f i (a 1 , . . . , a i ) for some deterministic function f i . We can also assume that the view of the adversary consists only of (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a p , b p , s) (as we did in proof of Theorem 13). The output of the honest party P 1 is r := s h m (s, a 1 b 1 ) . . . h m (s, a p b p ) .
To show security, we have to construct a polynomial-time simulator that, after obtaining a randomr ∈ {0, 1} m+ p from the ideal n-bit coin toss functionality, outputs  (ã 1 ,b 1 , . . . ,ã p ,b p ,s) such that (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a p , b p , s, r ) and (ã 1 ,b 1 , . . . ,ã p ,b p ,s,r ) are statistically indistinguishable.
To construct the simulator, we first construct auxiliary algorithms S i : Given a seeds,  values a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , and a bitr i , S i (s, a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ,r i ) f i (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 ,ã i ), and checks whether h m (s,ã i b i ) =r i . If so, S i returns  a i ,b i . Otherwise, S i tries again (picking a newã i ) . S i performs up to k tries. (k is the security parameter.)
We claim that the outputs of the following two games have, for all a i , . . . , a i−1 , statistical distance at most μ for some negligible function μ:
As this claim is shown exactly as the indistinguishability of ((a, b, s) , r ) and ((ã,b,s),r ) in the proof of Theorem 13, we omit the proof of the claim. Note that μ can be chosen to be independent of i. In the real model, we have that the distribution of (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a p , b p , s, r ) can be described by the following game G R :
In the ideal model, the distribution of (ã 1 ,b 1 , . . . ,ã p ,b p ,s,r ) can be described by the following game G I : s,r ) , . . . ,
To show that the outputs of those two games are indistinguishable, we first introduce a hybrid game H i : r, a 1 , . . . , a i ) (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a p , b p , s, r ) .
For i = 0, this is the game G I , and for i = p, this is the game G R . Note that we can reorder the computations in H i−1 as follows:
,
And we can reorder the computations in H i as follows:
When reordered like this, only the second line is different in H i−1 and H i , and it corresponds to the second line and first line of (4), respectively. Thus, by (4), the statistical distance between the output of H i−1 and H i is at most μ. Thus, the statistical distance between G I and G R , which is the same as the statistical distance between H 0 and H p , is at most pμ which is negligible.
This shows security in the case of corrupted P 2 .
Remark. We note that this protocol defines a "default value" for values not sent by the other party. Hence, it guarantees output even in the face of uncooperative parties and thus even achieves the stronger notion of a "fair" coin toss from [11, 23] (see also our discussion in Sect. 1).
Universal Composability (Statistical/Perfect Case)
In contrast to the stand-alone case, in the UC setting, statistically secure coin toss extension protocols are impossible. Intuitively, the reason for this difference is that our positive result for stand-alone security (Theorem 14) rewinds an adversary in a simulation, while this is not possible for UC security.
More precisely, we show that there is no protocol that runs a polynomial number of rounds, uses an m-bit coin toss functionality as a seed, and statistically UC-implements the n-bit coin toss functionality for n > m.
The proof of this statement is done by contradiction. Invoking Lemma 9, we can assume that a protocol for statistically universally composable coin toss extension has a certain outer form. Then, we show that any such protocol (of this particular outer form) is insecure.
More concretely, our plan of action will be as follows. For contradiction, assume a statistically universally composable (m → n)-coin toss extension protocol. We may assume that the m-bit seed coin toss is only invoked at the end of the extension protocol.
Also, slightly simplifying things, we can think of the produced n-bit coin toss as a deterministic function f (c, s) of the protocol transcript c (i.e., the transcript of all messages exchanged between the parties) and the m-bit coin toss s. Now for every transcript c, the set { f (c, s) | s ∈ {0, 1} m } of possible (valid) protocol outputs after transcript c is at most half the size of {0, 1} n . On the other hand, initially, almost all outputs of {0, 1} n should be roughly equally probable. Hence, a full transcript c "cuts away" about half of all possible protocol outputs.
By assumption, the transcript c is generated interactively from scratch, without using the m-bit coin toss s. Also, every party contributes only polynomially many messages to c. Hence, there is a single message that "cuts away" a non-negligible fraction of all possible outputs. Call such a message "critical." Our adversary A will corrupt one party passively and detect the first such critical message. When encountering such a message, A will then internally toss a coin. If heads comes out, A will continue the protocol run, and let the corrupted party send that critical message. If tails comes out, A will rewind the party and let it send a different message. We will show that this decision (whether to let the party send the critical message) has a non-negligible impact on the protocol's output distribution. More concretely, the probability that the protocol output lies in exactly that subset of possible outputs that would have been "cut away" by the critical message is highly correlated with the outcome of A's coin flip.
We will now proceed to formalize this proof outline. This will require some preparations.
For the following statements, we always assume that m = m(k), n = n(k) are arbitrary functions, only satisfying 0 ≤ m(k) < n(k) for all k. We also restrict to protocols that proceed in a polynomial number of rounds. That is, by a "protocol," we mean in the following one in which each party halts after at most p(k) activations, where p(k) is a polynomial that depends only on the protocol. (We do not, however, require the parties to be computationally limited.) We stress that a protocol in which the honest parties run in polynomial time automatically has a polynomial number of rounds; the restriction to a polynomial number of rounds is thus a very weak one.
Theorem 15. There is no non-trivial statistically or perfectly universally composable protocol for (m → n)-coin toss extension that proceeds in a polynomial number of rounds.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that π , using CT m , is a statistically universally composable implementation of CT n . By Lemma 9, we may also assume that π satisfies the requirements from that lemma. Setting D 0 Fix an environment Z 0 that gives both parties "init" input and then waits for both parties to output a coin toss outcome. Consider an adversary A 0 that delivers all messages between the parties immediately. The resulting setting D 0 is depicted in Fig. 5 . Denote the protocol communication in a run of D 0 , i.e., the ordered list of messages sent between P 1 and P 2 , by com. Denote by κ 1 and κ 2 the final outputs of the parties. For M ⊆ {0, 1} n and a possible protocol communication prefix c, let E(M, c) be the probability that the protocol outputs are identical and in M, provided that the protocol communication starts with c, i.e.,
where x ≤ y means that x is a prefix of y.
Note that the parties have, apart from their communication com, only the seed ω ∈ {0, 1} m provided by CT m for computing their final output κ. So we may assume that there is a deterministic function f for which κ 1 = κ 2 = f (com, ω) with overwhelming probability.
For a fixed protocol communication com = c, consider the set
Since the protocol π is non-trivial, we have that Pr[κ 1 , κ 2 = ⊥] is overwhelming. Hence, Pr[κ 1 = κ 2 ∈ M c ] − |M c |2 −n is negligible (otherwise, one could distinguish the real and the ideal models). Thus, for sufficiently large security parameters k, the probability that κ 1 = κ 2 ∈ M c is at least 2/5. (Here, any number strictly between 0 and 1/2 would have done as well.) Since E(M c , ∅) (for the empty transcript ∅) is, by definition, the probability that
for sufficiently large k. Since the protocol consists by assumption only of polynomially many rounds, c is a list of size at most p(k) for a fixed polynomial p. This means that there are a prefix c of c and a single message m (either sent from P 1 to P 2 or vice versa) such that cm ≤ c and
for sufficiently large k. Intuitively, this means that at a certain point during the protocol run, a single message m had a significant impact on the probability that the protocol output is in M c .
A message m that satisfies (6) for c := com we call critical. (Remember that com is the random variable describing the communication in an execution of the real protocol.)
Setting D j Note that in any execution, a critical m is sent by at least one party. So there is a j ∈ {1, 2} such that for infinitely many k, party P j sends a critical m with probability at least 1/2. We describe a modification D j of setting D 0 . In setting D j , party P j is corrupted and simulated (honestly) inside Z j . Furthermore, adversary A j simply relays all communication between this simulation inside Z j and the external machines P 3− j and CT m . For supplying inputs to the simulation of P j and to the uncorrupted P 3− j , a simulation of Z 0 is employed inside Z j . The situation (for j = 1) is depicted in Fig. 5 .
Since D j is basically only a regrouping of D 0 , the random variables com, ω, and κ i are distributed exactly as in D 0 , so we simply identify them with the corresponding random variables in D 0 . In particular, in D j , for infinitely many k, a critical message is sent by P j .
Setting D j . Now we slightly change the environment Z j into an environment Z j . Each time the simulated P j sends a message m to P 3− j , Z j checks whether
where c denotes the communication between P j and P 3− j so far.
If (7) holds at some point for the first time, then Z j tosses a coin b uniformly at random and proceeds as follows: If b = 0, then Z j keeps going just as Z j would have. In particular, Z j then lets P j send m to P 3− j . However, if b = 1, then Z j rewinds the simulation of P j to the point before that activation and activates P j again with fresh randomness, thereby letting P j send a possibly different message m . In the further proof, c, m, and M refer to these values for which (7) holds.
In any case, after having tossed the coin b once, Z j remembers the set M from (7) and does not check (7) again. After the protocol finishes, Z j outputs (b, β) . Here, b is as above, and β := 1 iff κ 1 = κ 2 ∈ M and β := 0 otherwise. (b, β := ⊥ if (7) was never fulfilled.)
Now by our choice of j, and since a critical m fulfills (7), Pr[b = ⊥] ≥ 1/2 for infinitely many k.
Also, Lemma 9 guarantees that the internal state of the parties at the time of tossing b consists only of c. So, when Z j has chosen b = 1, and rewound the simulated P j , the probability that at the end of the protocol κ 1 = κ 2 ∈ M holds is the same as the probability of that event in the setting D j under the condition that the communication , begins withc. This probability again is exactly E(M,c) by definition.
Similarly, when Z j has chosen b = 0, the probability that at the end of the protocol κ 1 = κ 2 ∈ M is the same as the probability of that event in the setting D j under the condition that the communication , begins withcm, i.e., E(M,cm).
Therefore, just before Z j chooses b (i.e., whenc and M are already determined), the probability that at the end we will have β = 1 ∧ b = 1 is 
for infinitely many k when Z j runs with the real protocol as described above.
The contradiction We show that no simulator S j can achieve property (8) in the ideal model, where Z j runs with CT n and S j . To distinguish random variables during a run of Z j in the ideal model from those in the real model, we add a tilde to a random variable in a run of Z j in the ideal model, for example,b,β.
Since the protocol π is non-trivial, for any S j achieving indistinguishability of real and ideal model, we can assume without loss of generality that S j always delivers the outputsκ 1 =κ 2 =:κ.
Recall thatb is independently and uniformly chosen afterM is determined and that κ is chosen independently by CT n . Hence, the variableb and the tuple (M,κ) are independent givenb = ⊥. Hence, sinceβ is a function ofM andκ,
Combining (9) with (8), we get that Z j 's output (i. e., (b, β), resp. (b,β) ) differs nonnegligibly in real and ideal model. So no simulator S j can simulate attacks carried out by Z j and A j , which gives the desired contradiction.
Actually, in the case of perfect security, impossibility holds even for protocols with arbitrarily many rounds. Namely, in the proof of Theorem 15, we have used that the protocol has only polynomially many rounds only in one place. Namely, we obtained in (6) that one party sends a message that has non-negligible impact on the probability that κ ∈ M. For perfect security, we need only that one party has some nonzero impact on that probability, i.e., we can drop the requirement on the polynomial number of protocol rounds in the perfect case. The reasoning in the proof stays exactly the same only that we end up with the left-hand side of (8) being nonzero instead of non-negligible. This suffices to show that the considered protocol is not perfectly secure and thus:
Corollary 16. There is no non-trivial perfectly universally composable protocol for (m → n)-coin toss extension (the number of rounds does not matter here).
However, we do not know whether or not there is a protocol for the statistical case that proceeds in a superpolynomial number of rounds.
Note that all discussions above assume that statistical security means security with respect to computationally unbounded adversaries, simulators, and environments, i.e., machines that can implement any probabilistic function, even, for example, the halting problem or similar. Often, however, statistical security is instead defined with respect to (computationally unbounded) Turing machines, i.e., machines that can only implement computable functions. To show the above results for this case, one could try and check whether all constructions given in the proof above are indeed computable or can be replaced by computable approximations. Fortunately, however, there is an easier way, using results from [27] . Proof. [27] shows that a bounded-time protocol universally composably implements a bounded-time functionality with respect to computationally unbounded adversaries / environments / simulators if and only if it universally composably implements that functionality with respect to computationally unbounded Turing adversaries / environments / simulators. Since the n-bit and m-bit coin toss functionalities are bounded time, too (n(k) can be evaluated in finite time), a protocol contradicting this corollary would also contradict Theorem 15.
Corollary 17. Say a protocol is bounded time if there is a (not
Similar reasoning applies to the perfect case, and we omit the details here.
CRS Extension
Before we go through the results one by one, we summarize the results of this section in the following show the existence of an n-bit coin toss protocol π for any polynomially bounded, efficiently computable n. This makes (m → n)-CRS extension trivial: One can ignore the m-bit seed and use the protocol π to produce an n-bit random string which is then used as the CRS.
In the setting of computational universal composability, the results from Sect. 3.1 carry over directly. To state these results, we first have to specify the ideal functionality CRS.
The following corollary shows that CRS extension is possible in the computational UC setting given sufficiently long seeds. Proof. The proof of Theorem 7 actually shows that an n-bit coin toss can be realized from an m-bit CRS. Furthermore, from an n-bit coin toss, we can trivially realize an n-bit CRS. Thus, from an m-bit CRS, we can realize an n-bit CRS.
The following corollary shows that extending coin toss is impossible in the computational UC setting for short seeds. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 8. (Except, of course, that we have to replace the mentions of the functionality CT by CRS and that the environment Z sends getcrs instead of init.)
The Statistical and the Perfect Case
For superlogarithmic m and n > m, Theorem 13 states that an (m → n)-coin toss extension is possible with respect to statistical stand-alone simulatability. This is not true, however, for CRS extension. We will show that CRS extension is impossible for any length m of the seed, both for statistical and perfect security, and both for stand-alone simulatability and UC. -There is a negligible function μ in the security parameter such that for any (possibly unbounded) adversary corrupting one of the parties, for every security parameter k, and for every set M ⊆ {0, 1} n , we have that the probability that the output of the honest party lies in M is at most 2 −n |M| + μ. 13 We begin with a proof sketch. For contradiction, assume a protocol π with bounds μ and ν as in the statement of the theorem. Let S denote the value of the seed (the initial CRS), and let R denote the outcome of the protocol (the extended CRS).
First, we find that there is an index i such that the i-th bit R i of R is not completely determined by S (up to some negligible error). If there was no such index, each bit of R would be determined by S, and hence R could only take 2 m 2 n different values. Furthermore, for a fixed value s of S, let α s denote the maximum probability that a corrupted Alice can achieve R i = 0. Similarly, β s denotes the maximum probability that a corrupted Bob can achieve R i = 1. For any fixed s, we are in the same situation as in a coin toss protocol that has to pick a random bit R i without using any seed at all. In this case, either Alice can enforce outcome 0 or Bob can enforce outcome 1 (Theorem 10). Thus, for all s, α s ≈ 1 or β s ≈ 1. Let V α := {s : α s ≈ 1}, i.e., V α is the set of all seeds for which Alice can enforce outcome 0. V β is defined analogously.
Let Δ α denote the probability that in an honest execution, S ∈ V α and R i = 0. Let Δ β denote the probability that in an honest execution, S ∈ V β and R i = 1. If both Δ α ≈ 0 and Δ β ≈ 0, then the value of R i would be determined by whether S ∈ V α holds. But this contradicts the fact that R i is not determined by S. Thus, Δ α ≈ 0 or Δ β ≈ 0. Without loss of generality, assume Δ α ≈ 0, i.e., with noticeable probability, in an honest execution we have R i = 0, but the seed S is such that a corrupted Alice could have enforced R i = 0.
Thus, a corrupt Alice can increase the bias toward 0 by the noticeably amount Δ α when compared to the honest case. But since in the honest case, the bias toward 0 is 1 2 , Alice can enforce R i = 0 with probability 1 2 + Δ α . This violates the security of the protocol π .
Thus, we have led our initial assumption to a contradiction; hence, Theorem 20 holds. We now proceed with the full proof.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that a protocol π with negligible bounds μ and ν as in the statement of the theorem exists.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that honest parties always give output in {0, 1} n or no output. We also assume that if both parties are honest (and all messages are delivered), with probability 1, both parties give the same output or both parties give no output. The latter can be achieved by adding two additional messages at the end of the protocol where the parties compare their outputs (and give no output in the case of disagreement).
For the remainder of the proof, we fix the security parameter k. We first make a number of simple definitions. Denote by the random variable S ∈ {0, 1} m the initial seed that is available to both protocol parties (the CRS). Let the random variable R ∈ {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥} denote the protocol outcome, i.e., the extended CRS, in an honest protocol execution. We write R = ⊥ for the case that no output is given. Let This shows Claim 2. Note the implications of Claim 2: Intuitively it states that (if μ is small) there is a bit of the protocol output that is (to a certain extent) undetermined at the start of the protocol, even when knowing the seed S.
In the following, let i be as in Claims 1 and 2.
Claim 3. It is
To see this, for any seed s ∈ {0, 1} m , we denote by α s the maximal probability for an adversary A * that corrupts the first party Alice to achieve R * i = 0. Analogously, by β s , we denote the maximal probability for an adversary that corrupts the second party Bob to achieve R * i = 1. Here, R * ∈ {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥} denotes the honest party's output and R * i denotes the i-th bit of R * . These definitions are similar to the definitions α and β from the proof of Theorem 10, except that here we consider the probabilities given a specific value s of the seed. Further, let γ s := Pr[R = ⊥ | S = s] (in the uncorrupted case). An analogous calculation to the one in the proof of Theorem 10 shows that for all s ∈ {0, 1} m ,
Now we define 
where ( * ) is an application of Jensen's inequality. Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. Then, we construct an adversary A * that corrupts the first party Alice and proceeds as follows. If s ∈ V α , it executes a strategy that achieves Pr R * i = 0 | S = s ≥ α s − ε. (We have to include the error ε since α s might be a proper supremum.) If s ∈ V α , the adversary A * behaves honestly. We get that 4n is handled analogously, except that now A * corrupts Bob and achieves Pr R * i = 1 | S = s ≥ β s + ε for all s ∈ V β . This shows Claim 3. From Claim 3, we immediately get Claim 20, since no pair of negligible functions μ, ν can fulfill (13) .
From Theorem 20, we can directly derive the impossibility of statistical and perfect coin toss extension for both stand-alone simulatability and UC.
that M outputs a sequence O com given inputs I com is the same as the probability that P outputs O com given inputs I com . It follows that M and M behave identically.
Note The interactive machine M constructed above can be very inefficient. Hence, removing state may cost efficiency. Alternatively, a machine M can be transformed into a stateless machine M that has access to an NP oracle [5, 21] . (These papers show that an NP oracle allows to uniformly choose a witness among all witnesses of a given NP statement. If we choose the witnesses to be the random coins of M, and the statement to be "M's history is consistent with its inputs and outputs so far," we obtain a stateless machine M that requires access to an NP oracle.) We thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
